INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to open this timely conference. I hope that the participants, each a distinguished authority in the social sciences and school desegregation litigation, will treat with tolerance my random remarks-old hat to many-on the role of social sciences in the judicial decision-making process in school desegregation cases. The conference is timely because the twentieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education' is a logical point at which to assess the relationship between school desegregation and the enhancement of the life chances of members of minority groups.
I have an old-fashioned fondness for Jhering, Erhlich, and Pound 2 who thought of law as a means to the end of protecting social interests by the authority of the state. These are the early socio-legal thinkers whose spirits hover over this conference. Perhaps Brown and its progeny may be rationalized in accord with their thinking without doing violence to Wechsler's doctrine of neutral principles.
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The conference is especially timely for another reason. It comes less than a month after the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision in the Detroit case, Milliken v. Bradley, 4 prohibiting busing across school district lines, absent proof that the school lines were drawn in a racially discriminatory manner or that state action caused interdistrict segregation.
Judges must be wary of their words, especially in discussing recent Supreme Court decisions. An important decision breeds litigation. Judges have to avoid the appearance as well as the fact of prejudging issues in cases, perhaps * Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 1his article is an edited version of the keynote speech given on August 18, 1974 at the opening of a conference on The Courts, judge, Judge Roth, could have been made by Jhering or Erhlich, and quoted with approval by Roscoe Pound. "This is incredible!" said Judge Weick. Judges "should [not] assume to act as legislators, for which they are neither fitted nor qualified. It is enough for judges to perform their judicial function and to abide by the separation of powers doctrine provided by our Constitution.' 12 It is interesting to note, however, that Judge Weick quoted1 3 from the Taeubers' influential study, Negroes in Cities, 4 and cited an article by Karl Taeuber in Scientific American.' 5 The Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley carefully avoids any reference to social considerations. The Court decided, as a matter of law, that "absent an interdistrict violation, there is no basis for an interdistrict remedy. ... ."16 But let us suppose that to bolster its conclusion and to show its general knowledge of the subject the Supreme Court had added one footnote, say footnote 11,17 citing Coleman, Pettigrew, Armor, Jencks, Moynihan, Jensen, 8 and other authorities for the propositions that the achievement increment of black children who are bused to obtain racial balance is not increased significantly enough to overcome the educational disadvantage of the children 12. 484 F.2d at 261. 13. 484 F.2d at 260.
K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES (1965).

Taeuber, Residential Segregation, 213 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 12 (August 1965).
418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974).
17. In Brown v. Board of Educ. the Court stated that segregation in the public schools had a detrimental effect upon the Negro children. "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson from low socioeconomic backgrounds; that the feeling of control over one's destiny has a stronger relationship to achievement than all the school factors together; that the equal protection clause may require affirmative action to integrate the schools, but integration cannot be equated with equal educational opportunity. Or, since, to put it mildly, it is difficult to find a common denominator of the conclusions of these social scientists, and others that might be cited, the footnote may have started, "See generally .. . .-19 Would the decision have been said to have been based on sociology rather than law?
In any event, the Detroit case was decided opportunely for this conference. Perhaps some of the participants attending the conference may be able to peer down the road and tell us the social consequences of that decision. What will be its impact on the trend toward metropolitan-wide solutions to the financing and delivery of public services, 20 or on the preservation of the inner core of cities-their historic areas, for example? What effect will it have on urban and suburban schools, on the socioeconomic gap between the races, on the educational and psychological effects of accelerated isolation of the races? A fruitful source of sociological inquiry will be to determine what data may justify an interdistrict remedy which the majority in Milliken v. Bradley permits when there is segregation traceable to interdistrict constitutional violations. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that interdistrict busing might be "proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations" than that presented in Milliken v. Bradley.
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Sociology has always played a part in the decision-making process, although frequently it comes in wearing a mask. Sometimes the mask is public policy or the interests of justice, sometimes judicial notice or common knowledge, sometimes legislative or constitutional facts. In these instances the judge, perhaps unwittingly, may be functioning as a sociologist without benefit of witnesses and solid empirical data and perhaps is treating the litigants unfairly. We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two Laces stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiorit\. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. objection to such practice is the disregard of the parties to the litigation, who are given no opportunity to be heard. [ The road is not smooth for the use of social science evidence in the courts. Testimony of experts for the plaintiffs forces the defendants to come forward with experts. If the trial is prolonged and played up in the communications media, the public impression is that the court is elevating sociology at the expense of law. And trial judges, who have less insulation than appellate judges, are sensitive to public opinion. There are not many Frank Johnsons, Bryan Simpsons, Herbert Christenberrys, and Skelly Wrights. All judges have cut their eyeteeth on the theory that they fill in only the tiniest of interstices between existing rules, and a Holmes or a Cardozo does not come along every day to distinguish betwveen the expansible and the non-expansible interstices.
29 Judge Weick's observation in Milliken represents the point of view most lawyers and laymen share: judges should stay within the judicial function; social considerations are for legislators.
Segregationists, to a man, criticized the Supreme Court's holding in Brown as one that was based on sociology rather than law, as if the two must be antithetical rather than closely related or complementary. For many uninformed people, even now, Gunnar Myrdal was the chief authority the Court relied upon, although his was only one of several names in a footnote. Even James Reston, writing for the New York Times, subtitled his article on the case, "Court Founded Its Segregation Ruling on Hearts and Minds Rather than Laws."" 1 On this point many advocates of integration were willing to agree with Reston. They regarded the resort to social science testimony as a new approach to school desegregation, and they were proud of the ability and trial strategy of the plaintiffs' lawyers. As everyone knows, the Supreme Court held in Brown I that "separate but equal . . . educational facilities are inherently unequal." 2 And, "even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal," segregation "deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational opportu n it ie s .
' ' a 3
There are certain aspects of the opinion that diminish the importance many persons attach to the sociological proof of harm caused by segregated schooling. The Supreme Court, in its opinion, did not refer to the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Clark, who testified in the three cases consolidated with Brown v. Board of Education, and to other witnesses, although more than forty social to prevent the imposition of "governmentally cast distinctions, predicated upon race.
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Those who have studied Plessy v. Ferguson in depth will see a similarity between this argument and that of Albion W. Tourge, attorney for Plessy, whose words inspired the first Justice Harlan. Tourg6e said, 43 Why not require all colored people to wvalk on one side of the street and whites on the other. One side of the street may be just as good as the other ....
The question is not as to the equality of the privileges enjoyed, but the right of the State I0 label one citizen as white and another as colored in the common enjoyment of a public highway. lated in the opinion, Brown was the product of irresistible social and political forces-"an idea whose time had come.-54 But the opinion broke no new ground in judicial methodology. The Court rested its decision on the content of the fourteenth amendment in the context of the time, confident that it was interpreting the Constitution as a living document for all times. Had there been no social data in the record, no footnote eleven, Chief Justice Warren, backed by all the Court, would still have been able (1) to start with the premise, as he did, that "we cannot turn the clock back," but "must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life"; 5 " (2) to argue in a traditional judicial manner, as he did, by analogy from Sweatt and McLaurin, that "intangible considerations" apply with "added force to children in grade and high school"; 5 6 and (3) to conclude that "sepal-ate but equal" is "inherently unequal." 5 7 The social science evidence was the kind of support a court likes to find in a record to lend factual and scientific aura to a result sustainable by other, perhaps purely abstract and sometimes formalistically legal, considerations, but dictated by the moral necessity of changing social attitudes. Paradoxically, I believe that the reaction of many vocal critics of Brown who characterized the decision as based on sociology, rather than law, has had a healthy effect on the use of social science research in the decisional process. Courts, since Muller v. Oregon, have respected the "Brandeis-type" brief supporting socially-oriented legislation .
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In Muller, however, and in similar cases, as Professor Paul Freund has pointed Out, 59 the data was used to sustain social legislation and might be considered legislative or constitutional facts of which a legislature might be presumed to have knowledge. In and after Brown, this type of extra-legal evidence has been used to attack legislation. The criticism of Brown focused the attention of judges and lawyers on the propriety and value of empirical data and social studies at both the trial and appellate levels. Statistics became more important to courts. has relied on studies developed by social scientists and other scientists to show pollution, unlawful exclusion of blacks from the jury system, employment discrimination, arbitrary or discriminatory use of the death penalty, discrimination against women, the need for reapportionment, and the cure for malapportionment of various public bodies. Throughout the country, educational centers in various universities have prepared desegregation plans at the request of school boards and district judges.
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Since Brown, in school cases involving de jure segregation, findings of fact are no longer needed to establish a substantive constitutional violation. This is the value of the de jure/de facto dichotomyit has a value. But fact findings are still needed in devising a remedy in dejure cases.
In de facto segregation cases, Professor Fiss has pointed out that "a principle requiring equality of educational opportunity must be abstracted from the equal protection clause.
.. 61 In applying this principle, the court must make -the empirical judgment whether the opportunity afforded Negro children is significantly and systematically inferior to that afforded others.' 62 This inequality may be apparent on its face. When it is not, a court is required to probe beyond the nominal level to determine whether this factual inequality exists. A court must make another judgment, "whether there is an adequate justification for any existing substantial difference in educational opportunity.
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Ten years ago, advocates of segregation asked the courts to make such a judgment. In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education ,64 a de jure case arising in Georgia, parents of white children intervened. They sought to justify racial segregation on the ground that social science research had demonstrated that it would be educationally harmful to black children from disa'!-vantaged environments to be forced into competition with white children. Their proof rested on the testimony and studies of several social scientists, some of whom one would have to acknowledge as legally qualified to testify."' Counsel for the black plaintiffs was Mrs., now Judge, Constance Baker Motley 6 6 who had ably represented James Meredith in desegregating the University of Mississippi. She objected to the social science testimony as irrelevant, It is interesting that in the Detroit case, 7 1 the trial judge, Judge Roth, permitted the suburban school boards to take the deposition of Dr. David Armor who earlier had written, based on his studies of various busing "experiences," that "busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of black students or for increasing interracial harmony.
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Judge Roth later refused to receive it in evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant; it represented "a new rationale for a return to the discredited ,separate but equal' policy." 73 Indeed, he excluded all evidence on the questionable value of crossdistrict busing. As noted earlier, in the Sixth Circuit The evidence was conclusive to the effect that the cranial capacity and brain size of the average Negro is approximately ten per cent less than that of the average white person of similar age and size, and that brain size is correlated with intelligence. Id. at 247. He also concluded from other evidence that white and Negro pupils of public school age have substantially different educational aptitudes and learning patterns which are innate in character and do not arise out of economic or social circumstance and which cannot therefore be changed or overcome by intermixed schooling ....
Id. at 248. He thus concluded that segregation of races was the only reasonable classification by the state and that Brown need not be followed under either resjudicata or stare decisis. However, Judge Mize struck down the segregation employed on grounds that it was bound by prior Fifth Circuit holdings. Although it is contrary to the facts and the law applicable thereto, this Court feels that it is required to enter an order making permanent the temporary injunction heretofore At this stage in school desegregation, when the nature of the remedy is important and district courts have broad latitude in using their equitable powers, social science is certain to play an important part in the decisional process.
In 1971, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 75 the Supreme Court dealt with de jure segregation in the Charlotte, North Carolina school system. The mandate in all such cases is to dismantle the dual school system lock, stock, and barrel. But the question of how to dismantle is the door through which social science research enters. Racially neutral plans may not be sufficient. Affirmative remedial action is required: for example, in the appropriate site selection of new schools, pairing and grouping of noncontiguous school districts, faculty ratios, and greater representation of blacks at the administrative level. However, the most obvious and effective remedy is busing of students. This is the remedy that has worked in the South, certainly in the non-metropolitan areas.
In Swann the Supreme Court unequivocally approved busing as a tool of school desegregation-subject to certain conditions. The conditions are unspecific: "the time of distance of travel [must not be] so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process." 7 6 This is an invitation, if not an advice, to parents and to school boards to produce social scientists as witnesses. It will then be the duty of the trial judge to weigh their testimony and to make findings showing the correlation between the proposed busing and (1) "the health of children to be bused" and (2) the extent to which busing may "impinge on the educational process." If such a case reaches the level of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, the appellate court must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial judge's finding. I expect white parents to come forth some day with social scientists producing data perhaps in the form of testimony and studies by David Armor or Christopher Jencks showing that busing raises the achievement level so slightly that it is not worth the trauma in individual cases or the friction it causes in the community; that the socioeconomic background of a child is a more significant factor in achievement tests than attending a desegregated school, but that this factor is inextricably bound with ressidential patterns, difficult if not impossible to break; that school achievement tests bear only a slight relation to economic achievement or life chances after children have finished their schooling. That kind of sociological evidence, if we may call it evidence, was in Dr. Armor's excluded deposition in the Detroit case. The courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have not ruled on the relevancy of such testimony under Swann. In the Fourth Circuit, however, Judge Sobeloff, in a special concurring opinion in Brunson," gave it short shrift as a return, under another name, to the doctrine of the inherent inferiority of blacks as against whites. If such testimony based on social studies is admissible under the Swann proviso, proponents of busing will have to come forward with countervailing social science evidence.
Keyes v. School District No. 1 78 arose in a more difficult context for the minorities seeking desegregation. In Denver there is a tri-ethnic population; for decades blacks and Hispanos 79 were concentrated in the central core of the city. But there had never been dejure segregation in Denver in the sense that schools had been segregated by statute, as they had been in the South. The district court found, however, that in one residential section there had been acts of de jure segregation stemming from deliberate, intentional segregative policies on the part of school officials-as demonstrated by a policy of concentrating blacks in black schools, by new school construction, and by boundary changes for school zones. 80 Racial separation in the school system as a whole, however, was not attributable to de jure segregation. The court held that "an equal educational opportunity is not being provided at the ... segregated [minority] schools .. The Supreme Court held, first, that the illegal acts forming the basis of the dejure finding had reciprocal ejjects throughout the system and therefore called for a system-wide remedy; and that the de jure finding as to part of the system raised a presumption that racial imbalance elsewhere was due to a policy of segregation which shifted the burden of proof to the school district.
The Court adopted a limited definition of de jure segregation: "the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.' In a Swann-type case it would relate to the substantive constitutional violation as well as to remedy. Social scientists would have to study and testify on the purpose and natural effect of residential segregation, site selection of schools, "feeder" schools, tracking, and other factors from which an "intention" to segregate blacks and Hispanos could be inferred. 8 3 Then, if busing is employed as a remedy, the requirements of the Swann proviso will have to be met, without crossing school district lines. In Keyes, the Court remanded the case for findings, and on remand the trial court found that the policies and practices of the school board established dejure segregation by the creation of a dual school system. , gave its approval to the use of pupil placement laws as a desegregation device. Such laws allowed (black) students to apply to transfer from their segregated schools to schools of the opposite race (white schools) in their district. All too frequently, however, a further barrier was superimposed on the pupil placement system, that being the grade-a-year limitation so that only one grade of students could request transfer the first year of the program and one additional grade each succeeding year. The combined programs effectively retarded significant integration for years. When it finally became clear that their purpose and effect was to frustrate integration, their application was enjoined. tablish an inelastic caste system. The affluent whites have sent their children to private schools. Most of the middle class whites, association with whom would produce a social class climate favorable to blacks in schools, have fled to the suburbs or sent their children to private schools. Apparently, too, the blacks accepted in private schools come from upper and middle class Negro families. The Detroit case will unquestionably increase the social stratification. Blacks, Hispanos, and disadvantaged whites will remain in the inner core of decaying cities, trapped in a vicious circle that, like all circles, has no definable beginning or end, but does have describable parts: inferior schools, poor housing, and low socioeconomic status. I can understand, therefore, the disillusionment black nationalists have with the progress and effectiveness of school desegregation. I can understand how separation of the races, if it means local control by blacks for blacks, may generate not the feeling of inferiority which the Supreme Court found in Brown, but a feeling of pride and respect-if the quality of education can be raised and economic opportunity increased. I do not approve of separatism under the guise of decentralization, or under any guise, but I think that I understand its motivation. Blacks suffer from a special stigma not carried by other deprived groups. It is what Professor Charles Black refers to as "walled-off inferiority";86 a legacy of three centuries of slavery and segregation, one that was legitimized in Dred Scott.
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I have received some enlightenment but very little comfort from the social science studies I have read. Perhaps, as Dean Frank T. Read has said, "One tool-the constitutional command of equal educational opportunity for all races articulated in Brown-cannot and should not be expected to solve alone the problem of segregated education." 8 8 He is right, of course. Judges should profit from other disciplines. In a sense, a judicial decision represents social science in action. Judges should acquire more knowledge of the social sciences to enable them to fulfil their policy-making function of using law as a means to the ends of serving society wisely and to its good.
Still, I have a deep conviction that the moral philosophy underlying the principle of equality established in the Second American Constitution that arose from the ashes of the Civil War is the primary source of hope for civilized racial relations in an integrated society. 
